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How have reforms in French doctoral education and academic research been implemented? 
How do changing doctoral education practices lead to changing research practices? New 
practice  adoption  among  academics  usually  happens  incrementally  in  the  course  of  their 
everyday activity. Top-down organizational change requires these autonomous professionals 
to adopt new practices willingly, so as to comply with the reform. Understanding the micro-
level conditions under which this adoption happens is critical to the management of change in 
universities  and  research  organizations.  Drawing  on  the  empirical  analysis  of  a  reform 
seeking to improve PhD supervision in French universities, we find that academics adopt new 
practices only once they have performed a cognitive reframing of the situation, and under the 
condition that new practices are – or  can be  made – compatible with their autonomy of 
judgment  and  their  extant  professional  role  and  identity.  Otherwise,  the  reform  leads  to 
ceremonial adoption, hesitation or rejection of new practice. Paradoxically, coercive features 
of the reform  may support new practice adoption, but only when they are taken over by 
professionals themselves and support them in the building of a leader figure compatible with 
professional values.  
Key  words:  University  policy,  Science  policy,  Change  implementation,  Practice  adoption, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
How does a reform get implemented in public sector research organizations and universities? 
Universities have not only witnessed dramatic growth over the last 20 years but, in most 
countries, their research activities have also undergone radical reorganization led by top-down 
reforms, some of which are implemented and produce the expected effects, while some are 
rejected and others adapted. The mechanisms by which a reform will produce effects in higher 
education and public sector research organizations is thus a critical issue for research policies.  
Whether labeled as “planned” (Neves and Caetano 2009), “deliberate” or “strategic” (e.g. 
Hinings and Greenwood 1988, Denis et al. 2001), top-down organizational change can be 
considered  implemented  when  practices  have  changed:  first,  this  means  the  reform  is  no 
longer just “ceremonial” but is actually having an impact on the organization’s production 
process;  second,  practice  adoption  is  also  a  means  to  trigger  a  shift  in  logic  which  will 
institutionalize change, so that it feels ‘natural’, thus finalizing the process of structuration. 
However, practices prove difficult to change from top-down, because they develop locally. 
This is even more true in a professional organization such as in research and higher education, 
where academics are autonomous professionals whose practice are inspired by professional, 
not organizational considerations. 
Therefore, our research question becomes how do academics, as autonomous professionals, 
adopt new desired practices in a context of a reform? To explore this question, our paper 
studies the reform of French doctoral education during its implementation. French doctoral 
education has been suffering from over specialization and lack of professionalism. In 1992, 
the French government launched a reform to improve doctoral education, seeking to make 
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market.  It  also  sought  to  trigger  the  emergence  of  communities  of  researchers  around 
transdisciplinary research programs rather than disciplines, trying to change how science was 
to be performed. How did such top-down change translate into a change of practices? 
Practice adoption is rarely studied as the primary target and outcome of a top down change. 
When  studying  practice  dynamics,  scholars  study  how  they  are  created  as  a  result  of 
spontaneous  innovation  in  activities  (Lounsbury  and  Crumley  2007)  or  via  institutional 
entrepreneurship (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence 2004), and how they diffuse horizontally at 
the macro level of populations or social settings (Strang and Meyer 1993, Rogers 1995), 
institutional fields (Greve and Davis 1997, Lounsbury 2007) or across national boundaries, 
(Tuschke  and  Sanders  2007),  thus  leading  to  isomorphism.  At  the  meso  level  of  the 
organization, members’ reactions in terms of practice following the introduction of externally 
produced technological (Orlikowski 1993, Barley  1986, Cooney and Sewell 2008; Garud, 
2002) or scientific innovations (Ferlie, Fitzgerald et al. 2005) have also been studied. On the 
other  hand,  different  dimensions  of  reforms  have  been  studied:  implementation  literature 
attempts to list the conditions under which a reform has more chances to be implemented 
(Winter  2006),  while  from  a  less  normative  viewpoint,  public  administration  and 
organizational  theory  scholars  describe  the  diverse  obstacles  faced  by  reformers,  such  as 
absence of impact (Brunsson and Olsen 1993), goal distortion (Selznick 1949), ceremonial 
compliance and decoupling or buffering (Oliver 1991), or unintended consequences (Merton 
1936, Blau 1973). We believe that top-down organizational change outcomes might be better 
understood if change is studied as a process of practice adoption. The practice approach to 
organizational studies allows for the connecting of micro-processes of change with such field-
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We find two types of mechanisms in new practice adoption. Vertical mechanisms are the 
coercive  means  at  the  reformers’  disposal,  such  as  threats  on  resources  but  also 
delegitimization of extant practices. Transversal mechanisms such as reframing a problem 
and proximity of situation rely on the dynamic between professional segments. Academics 
adopt new practices only once they have performed a reframing of the situation, and under the 
condition  that  new  practices  are  –  or  can  be  made  –  compatible  with  their  autonomy  of 
judgment  and  their  extant  professional  role  and  identity.  Otherwise,  the  reform  leads  to 
ceremonial  adoption,  hesitation  or  rejection  of  new  practice.  Paradoxically,  the  coercive 
means at the reformers’ disposal are not effective through direct power, but to the extent that 
they give power and legitimacy to some academics motivated, for diverse reasons, to take the 
responsibility for implementing the reform. Thus, we show that the way for a reform to be 
effective is to help academics to act as leaders, because the implementation of new practices 
relies essentially on them. These results also suggest that the ambitions of the reformers might 
be limited by the mission and identity of academics. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 – FROM REFORMS TO PRACTICES 
2.1 .1– Practices adoption as a critical step in organizational change 
We define practice as a social actors’ way of performing a set of activities identified as a 
professional routine, a task, a ritual… Compared to an activity, a practice is institutionalized 
as a way of doing things that is shared among actors and associated with socially constructed 
and shared meaning, thus making sense beyond the mere action. This institutional dimension 
is well translated by Jarzabkowski, : “Jarzabkowski (2005) views ‘activity’ as the actions of 
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refers to activity patterns across actors that are infused with broader meaning and provide 
tools for ordering social life and activity” (Lounsbury and Crumley 2007: 995) 
Practice is a useful concept to highlight some  obscure parts of organizational life, 
because it captures a kind of knowledge that people constantly apply in the performance of 
their tasks, but which cannot be easily codified, transferred to other settings or controlled, as it 
is developed through time, experience and socialization in a specific milieu (Bourdieu 1980, 
Schatzki  et  al.  2001,  Weick  2003).  Moreover,  how  practice  gets  shaped  and  become 
institutionalized attracts the attention of social scientists because it is a locus of connection 
between  action  and  institution,  agents  and  structure:  the  repeated  activities  of  actors  in  a 
social  setting  somehow  turn  into  something  more  solid  that  begins  to  make  sense  and 
constrain  action  (Giddens  1984);  observing  practice  allows  us  to  understand  how  actions 
make up institutions, and how institutions constrain actions. Practice evolution is a turning 
point of social change process and is an important key to assessing whether and to what extent 
change has occurred following a top-down organizational change attempt. 
Fernandez  and  Rainey’s  (2006)  literature  review  on  organizational  reforms  in  the 
public sector lists eight factors that might impact the result of change initiatives, of which the 
two  last  -  “institutionalize  change”  and  “pursue  comprehensive  change”  -  insist  on  the 
necessity for a reform to translate into changes in practices if it is to have an impact: “To 
make change enduring, members of the organization must incorporate the new policies or 
innovations into their daily routines.” Recognizing that embedding change is not easy, they 
mention Armenakis, Harris and Field’s (1999) model for reinforcing and institutionalizing 
change,  which  equates  “fundamental  organizational  change”  with  a  change  of  paradigm: 
“Individuals are essentially asked to change their theories of what is good, what is the best 
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responded to” (Armenakis, Harris, & Field, 1999, p. 632). 
These  two  models  are  prescriptive:  they  recommend  reformers  to  pay  attention  to 
practices, but do not say how to do this and what fosters or hinders practice adoption by target 
populations.  Authors  actually  examining  the  process  of  organizational  change,  such  as 
Brunsson and Olsen (1993) or Bozeman (1999) integrate practices in their reflection at some 
point, noticing how difficult they are to change as planned. These authors conclude - each in 
their own way and with their own perspective - that top down organizational change initiative 
stands a good chance to “slide over” the practices it is actually trying to change.  
2.2 – PRACTICE ADOPTION DEPENDS ON PROFESSIONALS 
Practice adoption is often studied as a side phenomenon in practice diffusion literature (Strang 
and Meyer 1993, Rogers 1995, Wejnert 2002). The latter is immense, because both terms 
have a very general definition. Strang and Meyer note that “Virtually everything seems to 
diffuse:  rumors,  prescription  practices,  boiled  drinking  water,  totems,  hybrid  corn,  job 
classification systems, organizational structures, church attendance, national sovereignty” 
(1993: 487), so that kinds of practice studied can be social, organizational or institutional. In 
the organizational context, the term can refer to corporate behaviors (Davis and Greve, 1997), 
formal structures (Greenwood and Sudabby 2006, Thornton, 2002), and technological choices 
(Leblebici 1991). This is because the term ‘practice’ is used widely  - as for instance, by 
Strang and Meyer: “We use the terms ‘practice’ and ‘innovation’ interchangeably to refer to 
the  diffusion  item,  which  may  take  a  variety  of  forms  (a  structural  element,  a  policy,  an 
attitude, and so on)” (1993: 507).  
In this paper, we focus on practice adoption in an organizational context. Diffusion 
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the social fabric. The notion of adoption insists more on actors’ agency instead, focusing on 
the trajectory leading to change in practices. Accordingly, Tuschke and Sanders (2007) make 
a  useful  distinction  between  adoption  by  ‘courageous’  adopters,  when  the  legitimacy  of 
practices is still contested, and diffusion, which they see as another kind of process altogether.  
Two literature streams help in framing the issue of practice adoption in a context of 
top-down change initiatives: one on the adoption of innovations when they come from outside 
the  organization,  the  other  on  professionalized  organizations  and  the  potential  tension 
between the concepts of professions and organizations. 
2.2 1– Literature on innovations adoption shows necessary local adaptation 
Van de Ven and Hargrave note that, in comparison with neo-institutionalists, “innovation 
scholars have focused more directly on the activities and difficulties that adopters experience 
as  they  attempt  to  implement  technical  or  institutional  innovations  that  were  developed 
externally and mandated on host organizations” (2004: 271). By and large, scholars tackling 
this  topic  unpack  the  work  of  adaptation  that  seems  indispensable  to  the  adoption  of  an 
innovation in a particular setting. Rogers (1995) uses the term “reinvention” to express how 
adopters modify an innovation to fit their local implementation setting and tailor it to their 
organizations’ specific needs and constraints (Van de Ven and Hargrave 2004: 271). Marcus 
and Weber (2001) show that, in the absence of such a step, the adoption can be purely formal 
and not change anything in organizational procedures. “The ‘not invented here’ syndrome is 
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2.2.2 – Top down change in professionalized organizations: an oxymoron?  
The  mediating  role  of  organization  members  in  practice  adoption  is  congruent  with  the 
literature  about  professionalized  organizations.  Strauss  (1963)  describes  professional 
organizations as “negotiated orders”: in such settings, how work is done does not primarily 
follow bureaucratic rules but is negotiated in a local context. Consequently, scholars who 
have  studied  professional  organizations  underline  their  tendency  to  segmentation:  “In 
general,  professional  organizations  consist  of  a  number  of  professional  groupings,  each 
working in their own directions, implementing their own professional values. How, then, is 
any measure of integration achieved in a professional organization?” (Bucher and Stelling 
1969: 10). This fits the situation of universities, consisting of professional segments defined 
by disciplines. Professional segments within universities and research organizations have also 
been defined as epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina 1999) generated by distinctive epistemic 
paradigms. The question of top-down change must take this specificity into account, as Denis 
et al. do in their study of organizational change in Canadian hospitals: “This study provides 
some indication of how change may proceed in contexts where no-one has full control, where 
divergent objectives are pursued by different groups, and where the legitimacy of change 
agents and change initiatives cannot be taken for granted.” (Denis, Lamothe and Langley 
2001:834).  
Ferlie  et  al.  (2005)  go  further  into  the  black  box  of  innovation  adoption  by 
professionals in their study of what predicts which innovations will be adopted in complex 
organizations  such  as  hospitals  and  primary  care  practices.  One  would  expect  that  in  a 
medical professional environment, innovations whose scientific relevance has been proven 
(evidence based medicine) would be readily adopted: but their field research shows that the 
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adoption  by  professionals.  The  reason  for  that  counter  intuitive  result  is  that  innovations 
generally  entail  changes  in  practices,  which  do  not  always  result  from  efficiency-driven 
choices,  but  are  strongly  determined  by  institutionally  defined  rules.  For  example,  the 
introduction  of  a  new  monitoring  device  for  arterial  conditions  leads  to  a  shift  of 
responsibility  for  routine  monitoring  from  doctors  to  nurses  (Ferlie  et  al.  2005:124):  the 
adoption of such an innovation then depends on whether the professionals concerned will be 
willing to or able to manage that shift of responsibility, which pertains to questions of role 
and identity more than to the strength of its scientific backing evidence. Interestingly, Ferlie’s 
article illustrates that, even when an innovation seems like a mere technical adaptation or the 
adoption  of  a  new  technique  or  a  new  device,  its  adoption  is  strongly  mediated  by 
professionals  to  ensure  it  remains  congruent  with  the  features  of  their  institutional 
environment.  
Previous  work  thus  shows  that  the  effective  implementation  of  top-down  change  in 
professional – such as research and higher education– organizations relies on the extent to 
which  the  professionals  concerned  will  adopt  new  practices,  that  adoption  depends  on 
professionals and thus might vary from one professional grouping to another. We explore the 
conditions under which professionals adopt or reject new practices imposed during top-down 
reforms. We use a qualitative and ethnographic approach in a context of a reform still in the 
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3. CASE  STUDY:  THE  REFORM  OF  DOCTORAL  SCHOOLS  IN 
FRANCE 
3.1 – CONTEXT 
Each year in France, the Ministry of Research offers about 4000 PhD scholarships (Ministère 
de la Recherche 2004) consisting of three-year salaries for PhD candidates1 working as junior 
researchers in research centers. Until the creation of doctoral schools (“DS”), the Ministry 
would attribute PhD scholarships to the M2 programs2 directors, who would then select M2 
student(s) receiving the scholarship(s) to prepare their PhD in one of the research centers 
affiliated to the M2 program. The teachers and director of the latter were also researchers in 
the former. Consequently, M2 programs were pools of future PhD candidates for the research 
centers,  with  the  M2  program  director  being  the  main  decision  maker  for  scholarships 
attribution.  The  reform  modifies  how  PhD  scholarships  are  attributed.  It  creates  doctoral 
schools as a set of research centers from one or several disciplines but working on a shared 
scientific program. Doctoral Schools become the primary recipient of and decision maker 
about PhD scholarships, thus replacing in this role M2 program directors.   
3.1.1 – The objectives of the reform 
This modification of the funding channel has the objective to have scientific communities 
emerging whilst building a strategic resource distribution system. The reformers thus seek to 
                                                 
1 This number has been steady since 1991. One third goes to Humanities and Social Sciences; two third go to 
Experimental Sciences. Additional PhD funding is provided by research associations, local government and 
private  companies.  In  Humanities  and  Social  Sciences,  75%  of  PhD  candidates  remain  without  funding 
(Ministère de la Recherche, 2004). 
2 M2 is the acronym for “Master 2”, the fifth year of academic studies following three years of “License” and the 
first year of Master. It initiates students into research and comprises the writing of a paper based on an original 
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make the distribution of PhD scholarships more simple and efficient, going from what is 
viewed as a “sprinkling” of resources (4000 PhD scholarships to over more than 3500 M2 
programs), to a more consistent and rationalized funding of scientific projects selected by 
relevant  communities  (each  of  the  300  or  so  Doctoral  School  can  now  receive  10  or  20 
scholarships and can concentrate resources on priority research projects).  
The other objective is to improve doctoral supervision, which reformers claim necessary to 
make  PhD  attractive  in  the  non-academic  job  market  and  thus  address  the  issue  of  PhD 
unemployment. Reformers argue that academia in France only offers about 3,000 positions a 
year, and so cannot absorb all the 10,000 PhDs who graduate annually (ANRT 2005: 7). On 
the other hand, non-academic job market does not recognized the PhD as a specific diploma, 
and PhD’s find it difficult to find positions that match their level of studies (Mangematin, 
2000).  Reformers  say  there  are  two  reasons  for  this  situation:  the  quality  of  the  training 
received during the PhD is not satisfactory (as shown by the high attrition rate, the excessive 
length of time taken to complete the PhD, the sometimes disputable relevance of the topics, 
supervision which is sometimes only symbolic or inexistent and PhD students being used as 
cheap  human  resources  by  research  centers  but  not  benefiting  from  any  real  training  in 
exchange); and the skills acquired by PhD graduates are not identified or valued in the non 
academic job market. Within the frame of doctoral schools, academics ought to formalize the 
content of PhD training and bind supervisors to follow common rules and respect common 
standards, agreed on collectively. Before the reform, the only requirement to start a PhD was 
to have successfully completed five years of university studies and found an academic willing 
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3.1.2 – Governance and Organization 
Doctoral  schools  are  governed  by  Scientific  and  Pedagogic  Councils  (SPCs), 
composed half of academics from the research centers, and half of representatives of non-
academic  funders  and  future  potential  employers  of  PhD’s  (local  government,  research 
associations, companies, etc.) under an academic chairman.  
The  SPC  targets  PhD  scholarships  to  priority  research  projects,  selected  based  on 
research centers’ suggestions and the doctoral school’s research program; it must check on the 
quality of every student registering for a PhD, whether there is a funding or not, and whether 
this funding comes from the Ministry or not. Upon the School director’s agreement, students 
start their PhD. A thesis contract is signed by the student and the supervisor (and three other 
parties:  the  lab  director,  the  university  president,  and  the  private  enterprise  party,  if 
applicable) which defines each of their rights and duties and refers to PhD as a paid, three-
year  teamwork  experience  in  a  research  center.  Beyond  the  third  year  of  PhD,  the 
continuation is conditional on the school director’s authorization. Moreover, Doctoral Schools 
offer  additional  in-class  training  programs  (network  building,  management  and  language 
skills, job search techniques…) and activities to help students’ plan their future non-academic 
careers. The Ministry also uses Doctoral Schools to collect data on PhD training: length of 
completion, number of students per supervisor, professional trajectories. 
3.1.3 – Promoted practices 
By making research funding and PhD candidates’ selection and supervision the main purpose 
of doctoral schools, the reform challenges several academics’ practices. Gathering research 
centers from several disciplines in one Doctoral School suggests that academics can manage 
critical  resources  and  make  arbitrage  across  disciplines,  while  legitimacy  is  traditionally 
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reform introduces collective control over individual practices of supervision, whereas this has 
been a subject entirely left to the discretion of supervisors, and academics, as peers, were not 
supposed  to  judge  each  other’s  supervision  methods;  the  objective  of  professionalization 
suggests PhD should be considered as a training to diverse careers, while traditionally it has 
been leading exclusively to research and academic career. Finally, the thesis contract and the 
system of data reporting promote one pattern of scientific work and PhD studies, where the 
established patterns have been many and diverse: scientific work is collective and PhD is a 
three-year, funded apprenticeship with daily lab attendance. 
The  research  design  aimed  at  documenting  the  reactions  of  academics  to  this  top-down 
imposition of new practices.  
3.2 – RESEARCH SETTING 
We chose two French cities which have between them 5 universities and 19 Doctoral Schools: 
City A (“campus A”) has one university comprising 5 Doctoral Schools and city B (“campus 
B”) four universities comprising 14 Doctoral Schools. Both campuses cover all disciplines 
and are embedded in dense industrial networks and economically dynamic regions. Table 1 
presents  an  overview  of  the  research  setting,  and  Table  2  the  main  characteristics  of  the 
doctoral schools.  
3.2.1 – Data collection 
 Our field work was designed to follow academics in a context of reform, through interviews, 
documents and non participant observation of key moments in the life of doctoral schools: 
We performed 90 semi-structured interviews lasting from 1½ to 2 hours (Table 3). Campus 
A’s Doctoral Schools were reviewed in 2005, campus B’s in 2007. 54 interviewees were from 
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doctoral school, but covered a variety of disciplines at both campuses, notably Engineering, 
Experimental  Sciences,  Social  Sciences  and  Humanities,  representing  collective  and 
individual organization of scientific work.  
We made non-participatory observations of pedagogic and scientific councils (two meetings 
of Chemistry-Biology and one meeting of Law-Social Sciences, all on Campus A) and of 3 
university meetings concerning non-academic career perspectives for PhD graduates.  
Minutes of the very early meetings of some of the doctoral schools (when they were first set 
up, where one can see participants wondering about the right norms and how to function 
together) and legislative texts and reports were other data sources. 
3.2.2 – Data Analysis 
We  analyzed  the  data  so  as  to  answer  the  following  questions:  How  the  reform  is 
implemented  through  doctoral  schools,  what  are  the  latter’s’  means  of  action?  How  do 
academics receive this reform? During interviews, we asked questions about the ways of 
funding research and selecting and supervising PhD candidates, in order to get a description 
of extant practices. When interviewees did not make any additional comment about a practice, 
we considered this as a mark of naturalized, old practice. When on the opposite practices 
would be commented, explained or criticized, we considered this as a mark of a recently 
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4. RESULTS 
We selected 8 cases of practice trajectories which we found led to four different outcomes: 
adoption, ceremonial adoption, hesitation and rejection (Table 4). We analyze the trajectories 
leading to each outcome and the mechanisms involved. We start with three occurrences of 
adoption, and subsequently examine contrasting situations (other than adoption) to highlight 
what mechanisms were missing in non-adoption. 
4.1 – ADOPTION 
During our field work, we were able to observe three new practices being adopted – in each 
case, academics actually changed how they performed their activities, even if only to a limited 
scope. 
Case #1: Biologists adopted a new way of allocating PhD scholarships, by choosing the 
project before selecting a student 
Change –Previously, the scholarship would be given to the best M2 program student, who 
would then choose the topic for their PhD – so that the research centre and the topic that 
would benefit from this funding depended on the student’s choice. 
Difficulties – In the previous system, supervisors knew the student before he or she was going 
to  get  the  scholarship;  such  recruiting  practice  was  seen  as  a  way  of  avoiding  errors  of 
recruitment, whereas “recruiting someone you’ve only seen for 10 minutes [during an oral 
presentation]” (1 – Biologist) was considered risky. This practice also allowed supervisors to 
‘invest’ in a student the year before the PhD, coaching them to be the best in class and thus to 
get the scholarship: they would – hopefully but not necessarily – then choose to work with the 
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was a student funded for three years who represented and additional human resource for the 
research team.  
Mechanisms  –  Interviewees  mention  the  explicit  pressure  made  by  the  Ministry  through 
frequent phone contacts for them to elaborate a scientific program proper to the Doctoral 
Schools and use PhD scholarships to fund this program. Interviewees think PhD allowances in 
the following year might be conditioned by their compliance with this requirement, and find 
in this a strong motivation to implement the new practice.  
Mechanism 1 – Academics’ belief that the allocation of financial resources depends on their 
compliance with the reform encourages the adoption of a new practice  
Moreover, because they belong to the same Doctoral School, biologists and chemists 
have to adopt a common practice in allocating scholarships. In this case, the chemists already 
used the practice promoted by the reform, so biologists had to follow them. Introducing a 
common  organizational  device  across  epistemic  communities  was  a  Ministry  decision 
designed to trigger practice harmonization, and was effective in this case because the Doctoral 
School was not just a formal structure requiring only ‘ceremonial’ actions, but was also the 
primary recipient of and decision maker about a strategic resource.  
Mechanism 2 – Introducing a common device across epistemic communities to manage a 
strategic resource favors new practice adoption  
Pressured  to  adopt  the  new  practice,  Biologists  also  performed  an  act  of  ‘self-
persuasion’ by borrowing a positive argument from the Chemists: that “it is not to the student 
to decide for the scientific policy” (6 – Chemist). This argument was later heard again, during 
an  interview  with  a  biologist,  from  which  we  conclude  that  it  had  travelled  from  one 
community to the other. Thus biologists draw on another epistemic community’s argument to 
reframe the adoption of the new practice: what was interpreted as a loss (“we will be forced to 
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autonomy over students on our scientific policy”). Practice is adopted because it serves the 
interest  of  the  community,  and  not  because  it  complies  with  a  top-down  organizational 
reform. We can break down this phenomenon into two mechanisms. First: 
Mechanism 3 – Borrowing an argument from another close professional segment supports 
new practice adoption. 
Second, this argument allows academics to reframe the reality leading to a sort of 
‘trade off’ which makes new practice adoption easier:  
Mechanism 4 – Trading off a loss for a gain supports new practice adoption. 
Finally, the adoption of this new practice could not have been completed without a 
new material organization. Chemists are already familiar with the practice and Biologists are 
aware of how chemists enact this kind of recruitment - they can see the material organization 
of  the  new  practice,  and  can  get  support  in  its  implementation  from  a  close  professional 
segment that is already using it.  
Mechanism 5 – Borrowing a concrete way to implement practice from another professional 
segment supports practice adoption. 
 
Case #2: Biologists adopted a new way of selecting PhD students by enlarging the pool to 
include  both  national  and  international  candidates  (as  opposed  to  recruiting  only  local 
students) 
Change – The previous practice was to limit the pool of candidates to the local university. 
Biologists thus started to select candidates via a transparent formalized procedure based on 
impersonal criteria, rather than recruiting someone known to them from previous interactions 
(e.g., M2 teaching, research internship). 
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afford  to  discourage  local  students:  “We  hardly  have  enough  scholarships  for  our  own 
students, why would we give them to students we do not know?” (14 – Biologist); second, 
recruiting a student they would not know from previous personal interactions was a risk (see 
Case n°1). Third, such a formal and collective selection procedure meant supervisors would 
lose control of the final decision: could anyone else than the supervisor be trusted to recruit 
PhD candidates for three years? 
Mechanisms – During interviews, Biologists mentioned the Ministry’s explicit requirement to 
foster  mobility  among  students  and  give  them  the  opportunity  of  working  in  different 
environments.  From  his  contacts  with  the  Ministry,  the  head  of  the  Chemistry-Biology 
doctoral school concluded that the number of PhD scholarships the school would receive next 
year would be correlated to their compliance with this new recruiting method. So (as for the 
previous practice), the belief in possible pressures on resource played a role (Mechanism 1). 
Two other phenomena supported practice adoption. First, interviews show that some 
academics have an argument to convince reluctant colleagues – and themselves – to adopt this 
new practice which highlights the advantage of having access to a larger recruiting pool, and 
therefore better candidates (see Table 6, quote n°7). This allowed them to see the situation 
from  a  different  angle  and  weigh  what  they  would  gain  over  what  they  lose,  confirming 
Mechanism 4. 
As  for  the  issue  of  recruiting  successfully  without  previous  knowledge  of  the 
candidate, academics decided on a threshold they would apply – that candidates must be in 
the first tier of their M2 class and have a good research internship evaluation. Candidates 
would then pass an oral examination on their future research subject. This procedure was not 
considered ideal - many academics pointed out during interviews that “good grades have 
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procedure adopted. However Biologists did not compromise on their autonomy of judgment 
and created a safeguard by retaining a right of veto for the supervisor on the jury’s decision: 
the supervisor could not choose a student who did not reach the threshold, but he could refuse 
to  work  with  a  student  imposed  by  a  jury  decision  based  on  a  set  of  formal  criteria. 
Professionals accept a solution that is not perfect to them, but they also adapt the new practice 
to their own requirements.  
Condition #1: The possibility for professionals to protect their autonomy of judgment from 
bureaucratic procedures is a condition for new practice adoption. 
Case  #3  –  In  all  professional  segments,  Doctoral  School  heads  started  to  express  a 
judgment  on  the  conformity  of  supervision  performed  by  their  colleagues  against 
predefined criteria (such as number of students supervised, number of years PhD took to be 
completed). 
Change – PhD supervision used to be a bilateral matter between a supervisor and his or her 
students, outside of any scrutiny. Following the reform, Doctoral School heads started to exert 
some control over their colleagues’ supervision, although to different degrees.  
·  In  the  Campus  A  Humanities  school,  the  dean  signals  the  following  practices  as  abusive 
during scientific councils: supervisors taking on too many PhD candidates and ‘never-ending’ 
theses. He also writes to every PhD candidates who has already taken more than 7 years, 
urging  them  to  finish  their  theses  and  threatening  not  to  allow  them  to  register  for  the 
following year.  
·  At the Doctoral School of Law and Social Science (Campus A), the dean decides to take 
action in a conflict opposing a seventh year student and his supervisor who told him that his 
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mediate  this  conflict.  As  a  result,  two  academics  will  read  the  PhD  thesis  and  give  an 
independent advice. 
·  At the College of Doctoral Schools in Science (Campus B), where the thesis contract has 
hitherto been a standard form signed once at the beginning of the PhD, the college director 
decides contracts will be customized for each student and reviewed every year thus allowing 
the director to check each student’s trajectory and identify and mediate conflicts at an early 
phase. 
·  The head of the Campus A Engineering Science Doctoral School checks on every PhD project 
before the official registration, and sends it back for modification when the supervisor has too 
many students or has a record of previous PhDs having taken too long.  
Difficulties – Exerting normative scrutiny consists in granting oneself the right to intervene in 
a colleague’s professional activity to notice deviance or problem relatively to a ‘normal’ or 
accepted way of doing things. Such intervention in a colleague’s business is not customary 
among professionals. Academics, as heads of doctoral schools, had to build a legitimacy to do 
so. The notion of scrutiny is unknown in the Humanities school, and the dean wonders if he 
even has the right to block a student from registering in PhD, once they have a supervisor; 
while the Social Science dean expresses a sharp awareness of ‘crossing a line’ and doing 
something unusual that her colleague would certainly consider intrusive. Scrutiny is more 
accepted in Experimental Science, where academics are used to having to share resources and 
follow collective rules, but the head of the Engineering Science Doctoral School still feels the 
need  to  justify  himself:  “What  I  am  doing  has  surprised  some  people,  but  I  am  here  to 
manage, not to be blessed by everyone”. (43 – Engineering Science) 
Mechanisms – In all these situations, academics are not primarily pushed by coercion (not 
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supervision conditions, length of thesis, supervisor/student conflicts need to be addressed. 
They agree in principle with the need to act, and the reform gives them frames or devices 
enabling them to identify an extant situation as problematic, thus triggering the adoption of 
the new practice of scrutiny.  
Mechanism 6 – The identification of extant situation as problematic and the possibility the 
reform offers of addressing it leads to new practice adoption. 
Although coercion did not inspire the adoption of this practice, the presence of the 
reform’s  material  device  worked  as  a  frame  supporting  that  action.  Formal  procedures3 
introducing scrutiny could just have been adopted ‘ceremonially’ – i.e., without changing 
practices; instead, academics used them to exert scrutiny. 
Mechanism 7 – Material devices set up by the reforms (such as monitoring tools) can be used 
by academics as a support to practice adoption.  
Encouraged by reframing and material support, academics still need to define a role 
that allows interventions in colleagues’ business – the more successful they are defining this 
role, the more efficient their interventions will be in enforcing the new norm. 
Humanities Doctoral School head doubts his ‘right’ to act as a manager, and so limits 
himself  to  “non-nominative  remarks”;  at  the  Social  Science  school  the  dean  is  aware  of 
‘crossing a line’ and doing something unusual (“his supervisor will probably haul me over the 
coals…”).  Her existing role of ‘colleague’ (Table 6, quote 13a) does not allow her to act, 
while the role of ‘manager’ implied by the reform is unacceptable to her. What pushes her to 
intervene is that she is convinced that it is the mission of the Doctoral School to mediate 
                                                 
3 a) The head of doctoral school must sign every new PhD student registration, b) a thesis contract is signed by 
the  PhD  student,  the  supervisor  and  the  doctoral  school  upon  the  first  year  of  registration  and  c)  students 





































2  22 
conflicts. She then crafts a role she describes as “representative of the collective”, so she can 
address her colleagues, not as a hierarchical manager, but as ‘the voice of the collective’ 
(Table 6 quote 13b). In contrast, the dean of the Engineering Science school relies on the role 
of  manager,  with  which  he  is  familiar  from  in  his  previous  industrial  career.  Finally,  in 
experimental  science  of  Campus  B,  the  practice  of  scrutiny  did  not  exist  either  but  the 
Doctoral  School  head  felt  he  was  legitimate  to  introduce  it.  He  put  forward  the  fact  of 
contributing to solve conflicts by anticipation. (However, in this case the interview took place 
a few  years after the practice had been introduced, by which time it might have become 
naturalized).  
Condition #2: The building of a role which is both congruent with extant professional identity 
and mission and the use of new practice is a condition to its adoption. 
These  three  examples  show  how  academics  adopted  a  new  practice,  effectively 
changing their way of performing aspects of their activity. We turn now to aspects of the 
reform  that  were  either  introduced  ‘ceremonially’  (that  is,  without  effectively  changing 
practices or activities), or not introduced at all.  
4.2 – CEREMONIAL ADOPTION 
We  use  the  term  ‘ceremonial  adoption’  to  describe  the  situation  when  professionals 
apparently exhibit a new way of doing things, but actually stick to the bulk of their previous 
practices. 
Case #4 –All professional segments set up procedures for allocating PhD scholarships at 
the doctoral school level (on an interdisciplinary basis), but kept making the final decision 
within their own disciplines 
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thus symbolizing the funding of a common, cross-disciplinary scientific program. However, 
these procedures served as protective ‘curtains’, behind which extant practice persisted. What 
is decided at the Doctoral School level is how many scholarships each discipline will receive, 
based  on  arithmetic  considerations,  but  the  decisions  as  to  which  projects  are  awarded 
scholarships are still made within the disciplines, just as they were before the reform. 
Difficulties – For academics, implementing this practice meant judging the quality of research 
projects from a different discipline than their own. For example, chemists and biologists must 
judge together the quality of a biology PhD project, and sociologists and jurists participate in 
deciding about a history student or PhD topic. Academics refused to do so because they felt 
they had neither the legitimacy nor the competence, just as they felt colleagues from other 
disciplines would lack those qualities to judge projects in their disciplines. Thus a chemist 
says he does not “understand anything [about] a Biology project”, and that biologists and 
chemists “do not speak the same language” (6 - Chemist). The new practice is incompatible 
with how the academic profession is structured around sets of epistemic communities with 
strong boundaries (Knorr-Cetina 1999). 
Mechanisms – Because they are sensitive to the resource argument (mechanism 1), but cannot 
make sense of the new practice, nor relate it to a problem they encounter in their everyday 
activities, academics decouple their symbolic behavior from their actual practice and set up a 
ceremonial adoption (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Fiss and Zajac 2006). They comply in a way 
that does not actually affect their prevailing practices. Here, the absence of reframing hinders 
new  practice  adoption.  Impossibility  to  combine  the  new  practice  with  the  exercise  of 
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Case  #5  –  All  professional  segments  organized  in-class  PhD  training,  but  supervisors 
mostly considered training as a waste of PhD working time. 
Change – In-class training was organized and students’ attendance was controlled (except in 
Humanities). But academics in charge of in-class training complained supervisors did not 
inform their students about its availability. “Most supervisors don’t care at all about in class 
training. They don’t give any information to their students, some even advise them not to go 
and waste their time in that kind of rubish”. (27 - Historian). Some supervisors interviewed 
found the activity interesting but knew little about it, while others were hostile or indifferent, 
considering it useless, irrelevant or even a waste of time if it competed with the research 
effort. For them, as for their students, additional in-class training remained an administrative 
obligation disconnected from PhD research work and enforced by a sanction: in-class training 
attendance is a condition for thesis defense.  
Difficulties – Supervisors consider they are already professionalizing their students, as this 
linguist underlines: “When we were told to focus on professionalization, I was replying “wait 
a second… when I am teaching, I am professionalizing students!” […] As far as I know, 
university is supposed to train people to professions!” This Engineering Science researcher 
regards professionalizing students as meaning training them to professional research standards 
-  i.e.  to  make  sure  they  have  a  good  topic,  do  good  research,  publish,  attend  important 
conferences, build networks etc…“I am not dealing with that [the choice of trainings]. They 
have English class, management, CV writing, things like that. My objective is that they get a 
good CV, international publications, conferences, and an interesting topic. For the rest, it is 
their business, they are grownups”.  
While PhD unemployment is indeed perceived as a problem, in-class training does not appear 
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agency’: they are in post to train researchers, not to be concerned with the state of non-
academic  job  market  and  manage  their  students’  integration  into  it.  Others  criticize  the 
political  choice  behind  the  idea  of  in-class  training:  “We  know  what  they  mean  by 
professionalization. They mean sending students where they will never find a job, companies 
and things like that. They should create more academic positions instead!” (Linguist).  
Mechanism – As in case n°4, strong coercion combined with the absence of reframing leads to 
the decoupling of symbolic behavior from actual practices. This confirms the critical role of 
reframing, and the importance for the new practice to be congruent with extent professional 
mission and identity.  
4.3 – HESITATION 
We created this category for practices that seemed like a good idea to their early supporters, 
but the latter self-censored themselves because they knew the new practice would be judged 
too far from what is legitimate, as in this case. 
Case #6 – The head of the Law and Social Science Doctoral School acknowledges the 
practice of collective supervision through PhD committee, but does not follow it through.  
Change (not adopted) – Being confronted to a supervisor student conflict after 7 years of 
thesis, (see case 3), the Law and Social Science Doctoral School head realizes such conflicts 
need to be detected earlier, and borrows from the Experimental Science schools the idea of a 
systematic  review  after  2  years  of  thesis.  The  new  practice  consists  in  generalizing  an 
intermediary defense jury half way through the thesis, or whenever a candidate or supervisor 
might need it to overcome a difficulty. She adopts the practice individually, but does not try to 
generalize it, thinking it will conflict too sharply with extant practices and representations.  
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supervisor. In the reality, PhD students do sometimes find a ‘shadow’ supervisor for a part (or 
all) of their work, if their official supervisor is absent, unavailable, or where the two lack 
affinity – but such arrangements are rarely made official because they are interpreted as being 
critical of the supervisor. The head of doctoral school does not feel she wants to make such 
matters explicit through having a formal procedure such as a thesis committee: “It would start 
a revolution, instantly!” (27 – Sociologist). 
Mechanisms – The Doctoral School head’s interest for this practice was not a reaction to any 
kind of coercive mechanism, but stemmed directly from one of the reframing mechanisms – 
an extant situation viewed as problematic, and  now as  capable of being  addressed – and 
inspired  by  proximity  (borrowing  an  arrangement  from  another  professional  segment). 
Nevertheless, non adoption suggests something is missing: the reframing is only individual, 
and the practice gains support neither from collective legitimization, nor from coercion: and 
so  is  not  adopted.  Interestingly,  the  supporter  of  this  practice  has  a  strong  hierarchical 
position, but does not draw on this strength – her role as ‘colleague’ prevails over that of 
‘manager’. Contrary to the example of scrutiny, she does not design a role that would allow 
her to overcome resistance and promote this new practice – underlining how reframing needs 
to be supported by a role congruent with new practice.  
4.4 – REJECTION 
Practice rejected is openly considered irrelevant and not implemented. 
Case #7 – Historians refuse to adopt the practice of co-supervision 
Change  (not  adopted)  –  In  Humanities,  traditionally,  supervision  is  performed  by  one 
academic. In campus A, the university management asked the Humanities Doctoral School 
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supervise a thesis on the rationale of training younger researchers to supervision.  
Difficulties – Co-supervision is reported as “unknown” in Humanities, where “the researcher 
is first and foremost an individual”, and “doing research in a team is a blurry notion” (28 – 
Historian).  It  emerged  in  experimental  science  to  address  a  specific  issue:  as  the  context 
involves manipulating instruments and handling potentially dangerous substances, students 
must be watched closely, and one supervisor cannot follow more than two or three students by 
themselves. When supervisors had too many students to follow, they got help from younger 
researchers, who could not officially supervise research as they lacked the necessary grade4 – 
and so the practice of co-supervision was born. Academics using co-supervision found the 
practice  interesting  because  it  allowed  young  researchers  to  get  some  experience  in 
supervising  research  early  in  their  career.  The  university  management  tried  to  ‘sell’  this 
argument to the historians, but they do not have the same problem of ‘watching’ too many 
students at the same time “I have 8 or 9 doctoral students working around me; they do take a 
lot of my time, but well… Discussing, reading and commenting papers they send me, advising 
them to go see this or that… We meet on their request. It can be frequent, it can be irregular. 
It becomes more frequent as they reach the end of their theses”. (28 – Historian). Moreover, 
there is a strong individualistic stance in Humanities: academics value individual work and 
the fact of being able to trace ‘who did what’ in an article, or in a supervision. For them, a 
bilateral frame of supervision is positively connoted. 
Mechanisms – Verbal pressure from the University management’s on academics remained 
without effect. Reframing mechanisms did not apply either: unlike normative scrutiny, co-
supervision  does  not  address  any  problem,  nor  does  it  relate  to  any  mission  historians 
                                                 
4 “Accreditation to Supervise Research » is a grade that can be obtained a few years after the PhD, based on  a 
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recognize. However, non-adoption does lead to a form of change: as the suggested practice is 
obviously  imported  from  Experimental  Science,  it  signals  that  Humanities’  practices  are 
somewhat less legitimate and less relevant than the latter’s. It contributes to creating a feeling 
that their practices become marginalized: “This idea is transmitted by the Presidency and 
comes from medical or technological sciences. The reason for it, after what I heard, is that a 
supervisor that has a lot of students around him does a poor job supervising them. And that, if 
there is another supervisor, the student might benefit from a better supervision. I think this is 
an odd reasoning. For us, the relation is more between a supervisor and his student. It comes 
from traditions, from different ways of working between the humanities and the sciences”. (28 
– Historian) 
Mechanism  8:  Overtly  suggesting  the  adoption  of  one  particular  professional  segment’s 
practices contributes to delegitimizing other segments’ practices. 
 
Case #8 – Humanities academics refuse to make in-class training mandatory.  
Change not adopted –– Humanities Doctoral School sets up in-class training, but unlike other 
Doctoral School does not make it mandatory (as required by the reform). 
Difficulties  –  According  to  interviewees,  making  training  mandatory  challenges  the  basic 
notion of PhD candidates as autonomous adults engaged in an intellectual journey and able to 
make the right decisions for themselves. 
Mechanism: The dean of the Humanities Doctoral School mentions ‘pressures’ to make in-
class training mandatory, without effect (Table 6, quote 5). Reframing mechanisms do not 
help either: mandatory training do not match the idea academics have about their mission 
(coaching  adults  as  opposed  to  training  students).  However,  support  to  other  segments’ 
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school dean feels he is being congruent with his professional identity and mission. But he also 
feels he is becoming a deviant - “We held on. Or off, I don’t know!” signals his awareness of 
a new norm, which neither he, nor his profession, can comply with. By contrast, the way 
scientific work and PhD supervision are organized in experimental science is legitimized by 
the reform. This confirms mechanism #8. 
Below we summarize our findings in terms of mechanisms supporting practice adoption (fig. 
1) and illustrate their impact by quotations or examples (table 6). 
5. DISCUSSION – MECHANISMS PLAYING A ROLE IN PRACTICE 
ADOPTION 
We found two categories of mechanisms playing a role in practice adoption: those depending 
on reformers which we labeled “vertical” and those relying on the dynamics in and across 
professional  segments,  which  we  labeled  transversal.  How  they  interplayed  suggests 
academics have a strategic position in reform implementation, which reformers must not only 
take in account but also rely on when managing a process of change.  
5.1 – VERTICAL MECHANISMS 
Four tools belonging to the realm of reformers triggered the adoption of new practices among 
academics: making threats and promises on future resources, forcing professional segments to 
share  a  common  organizational  device,  anchoring  the  reform  into  material  devices  and 
legitimizing or delegitimizing extant practices. While the initiative to use these tools is up to 
the reformers, their impact was not systematic. Instead, three of them were strongly mediated 
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First, the varying impact of threats and promises on resources across epistemic communities 
suggests that academics made a strategic use of this coercion tool. They all knew that the total 
number of scholarships would not grow, so the Ministry can only act at the margin to raise or 
diminish  the  number  of  scholarships  each  Doctoral  School  will  get.  But  the  resource  is 
extremely  strategic  for  Experimental  Sciences  and  it  is  realistic  for  them  to  adopt  the 
promoted practices as they are close to their extant practices; so this argument has an echo 
and is often referred to as a reason to act. In Humanities and Social Sciences, the general 
stance is to deny the reality of this threat. This is to be correlated with the fact that these 
disciplines mostly do without PhD scholarships – they get PhD candidates anyway – and the 
promoted practices are perceived as foreign; it is not likely that academics will accept such 
radical change for a little of a relatively non strategic resource. Interestingly, however, the 
argument  can  be  used  to  justify  one’s  implication  in  the  reform  implementation  and  try 
motivating  colleagues:  One  Humanities  Doctoral  School  head  recalls  that  he  has  had  “a 
ministerial pressure on my back! In Ministerial surveys, they have an item ‘Doctoral School 
scientific program’. What will I write? At stake, our recognition, our resources, maybe the 
number of scholarships that will be given to us…” (28 – Historian). He was thus promoting 
the elaboration of a common scientific program by the academics making up his doctoral 
school (a rather awkward thing in Humanities). 
In the same way, common organizational device encouraged new practice adoption to the 
extent that academics could preserve their autonomy; otherwise it led to ceremonial adoption; 
and material device had an impact when academics in charge of implementing the reform 
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Legitimizing extant practices has the most systematic impact – although delayed in terms of 
practice adoption – because of cross legitimization – by legitimizing extant practices, the 
reform gets legitimized in turn, because it is de facto implemented. 
Actually, the most interesting property of vertical mechanisms is not the direct power they 
have over academics, but the fact that they support those willing to implement the reform. In 
other words, it is not as direct coercive tools that they are the most effective, but when they 
are taken over by academics because they think it is worth it: either because they think that 
they can relatively easily protect their existing resources or get more of them (Experimental 
Sciences); or because they fundamentally agree with the purpose of the reform (Experimental 
Sciences, Social Sciences and Humanities).  
5.2 – TRANSVERSAL MECHANISMS: REFRAMING AND PROXIMITY  
5.2.1 – Reframing 
We define reframing as the fact of looking at the same situation from another angle and 
perceiving previously unseen aspects, thus allowing for the formulation of a fresh judgment 
on the situation. It relies on the fact that “Change occurs as a result of participants’ reflections 
on and reactions to various outcomes of previous iterations of the routine” (Feldman 2000). 
5.2.1.1 – Figuring out a trade off 
In trade-off, academics begin to acknowledge that the extant situation has faults that weigh on 
their activity and that they could enjoy better conditions for their activity if they could get rid 
of these practices. And while proposed new practices initially generated only resistance and 
feelings of foreignness, academics begin to see what they could offer. Reformers cannot use 
this mechanism on purpose: perceptions about good and bad are obviously deeply rooted in 
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their own argument for the new practices. 
 
5.2.1.2 – Identifying an extant situation as a problem that needs addressing 
Never-ending  theses  have  always  existed5,  but  at  the  practice  level  scholars  have  never 
addressed this situation because they would not see it as a problem. In the same vein, conflicts 
between supervisors and students have always arisen but no one was trying to solve them, and 
they would usually end up with PhD abandonment. The reform raises these questions and at 
the same time offers academics possible tools to address them – which encourages some 
academics to revive their interest in those situations and consider them as problems, requiring 
actions to solve them. This resembles those ‘interruptions’ in the course of activity which 
Weick noted can lead practitioners to step back and adopt a reflective stance on their own 
practice, opening up the possibility of change (Weick 2003). 
5.2.2 – Proximity 
In an organization comprising several professional segments, proximity refers to the situation 
where two of them share common characteristics in the way they are organized, the object 
they work on, or the issues they are confronted to. It allows professionals to be inspired by the 
practices  of  another  segment  that  they  judge  close  enough  to  them.  Basically,  proximity 
allows  imitation  through  the  borrowing  of  arguments  and  the  mimicry  of  material 
arrangements. The basic principle of this mechanism is that it is relatively easier and more 
straightforward for professionals to imitate other professionals that they somehow identify to, 
than to implement the orders of an organizational hierarchy to which they find difficult to 
relate. 
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5.3  –  CONDITIONS:  COMBINING  BOTH  TYPES  OF  MECHANISMS,  PROTECTING 
AUTONOMY  AND  MAKING  NEW  PRACTICE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  IDENTITY 
COMPATIBLE 
All cases of adoption relied on both vertical and transversal mechanisms. This combination 
seems  to  be  a  condition  for  practice  adoption  (Table  7).  Moreover,  the  tendency  or  the 
necessity  to  preserve  professional  autonomy  is  an  important  limitation  to  the  effect  of 
transversal mechanisms. Reframing has an effect on practice adoption as long as the proposed 
practice is or can be made compatible with professionals’ freedom of judgment. When they 
cannot protect their  autonomy, professionals would rather reject a practice (if coercion is 
mild) or adopt it in a ceremonial manner.  
Building  a role suitable for the new practice is one more necessary  condition to practice 
adoption, even when transversal mechanisms occur. Because practices relate to professional 
mission, the question academics ask themselves when considering a new practice is “How 
does this fit with my professional identity and mission?” If it does not, the questions become 
“Who am I when I’m doing this”, or maybe “Who am I to do this?” If they cannot come up 
with a role that is both congruent with their professional identity and with the new practice, 
they  do  not  adopt  it  since  they  cannot  make  sense  of  it.  Accordingly,  we  observed  that 
academics who have to occupy a position of ‘manager’ because of the reform – that is, heads 
of doctoral schools – strive to forge a role that does not exist in the academic world, that of 
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practices since academics in charge of implementing the reform cannot act as leaders (Case 
n°6) 
6. CONCLUSION 
Our case study shows that during the reform, new practice adoption occurred when vertical 
and transversal mechanisms combined. Vertical mechanisms launched the dynamic of change, 
but  academics  adopted  new  promoted  practices  only  once  they  had  performed  reframing, 
either  through  figuring  out  a  trade-off  between  the  old  and  the  new  practice,  or  through 
perceiving an extant situation as a problem. Moreover, reframing translated into new practice 
adoption  under  two  additional  conditions:  the  new  promoted  practice  had  to  preserve 
academics’  autonomy  of  professional  judgment,  and  be  compatible  with  their  existing 
professional  role,  mission  and  identity;  otherwise  new  role  had  to  be  built.  When  these 
conditions could not be met, academics were able to set up ceremonial adoption in order to 
comply with the reform without changing their practices, or simply ignored it, when they had 
no incentive to comply. 
Paradoxically,  what  looked  at  first  like  the  most  coercive  mechanisms  at  the  reformers’ 
disposal (such as pressures on resources,  challenging professional boundaries, introducing 
devices of monitoring and control) all depended to some degree on academics to become 
efficient  in  terms  of  practice  adoption.  What  looked  like  an  indirect  coercive  tool 
(legitimizing and deligitimizing of extant practices) was actually the one that is not mediated 
by professionals. It had an impact – delayed, but outside of any professional influence. 
This  review  of  mechanisms  explains  the  strategic  position  of  academics  in  the  reform 
implementation. First, reframing which is entirely up to academics plays a central role in any 
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“vertical” are (for three of them) strongly mediated by the academics.  
Such results suggest that a reform stands more chance to be implemented at the practice level 
when it is taken in charge by the professionals  themselves, and when these professionals 
manage to build a legitimacy to act as leaders among their colleagues, this last factor being 
decisive.   
Therefore, reformers must focus on the following points when implementing a reform:  
1-  They can legitimize and delegitimize extant practices – the  impact being delayed but certain 
overtime;  
2-  They can trigger reframing by designing the reform so as to offer academics tools to act on 
problems.  
3-  They  have  to  motivate  academics  to  take  charge  of  the  reform  implementation.  This  is 
triggered by one or several of the following: the reform promotes at least partly  existing 
practices, the idea being to diffuse these existing practices to the rest of the field; reformers 
are  close enough to the academics so  as to be aware of the dormant  problems identified 
among them; and reformers use the threat on resources towards populations who are already 
close to the promoted practices. 
4-  Finally, reformers must also design the reform so as to supply academics with tools to build a 
managerial  stance  or  a  legitimacy  that  will  allow  them  to  act  as  leaders,  since  reform 
implementation  rely  essentially  on  them.  This  crafting  of  a  new  role  is  part  of  the 
‘hybridization’ operation (Ferlie  and Geraghty  2005), critical for the implementation of  a 
reform in a professional organization, as well as a cornerstone of professional organizations’ 
management. How academics manage to build such a role is a critical avenue of research for 
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Our  results  also  suggest  the  limited  power  of  reformers  and  highlight  the  “continuing 
limitations  to  reform  strategies  designed  to  achieve  ‘big  bang’  change  in  public  service 
organizations”  (McNulty  and  Ferlie  2004).  Practice  cannot  be  changed  drastically  and 
suddenly in a professionalized – such as research and higher education – organization. The 
reform must rely on what already exists and have reasonable objectives of slowly moving 
from there to the target situation. Reformers must also be able to integrate feedback of the 
professionals within the reform, since the more motivated the professionals will be, the more 
new practices will be adopted and the reform will bring change. 
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B – Table 2: Main characteristics of doctoral schools studied  
 
C – Table 3: Interviews 
 Distribution per position 
City 
A  City B  Other  Total 
dean's office (university president, research VP…)  6  2     8 
members of doctoral school scientific council  19  6     25 
administrative assistants  5  4     9 
Supervisors  11  5     16 
doctoral students  6  14     20 
potential non-academic employers        3  3 
PhD graduates     6  1  7 
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D – Table 4: Promoted practices and their outcome 
Practice promoted: how 
to… 




topic first, then student 
Best M2 student is entitled to a PhD 
scholarship; then she chooses a topic, 
which in turn gets funded. 
PhD scholarship must be targeted to a 
topic relevant in terms of the doctoral 
school scientific program; then a 







together with other 
disciplines 
Decisions impacting the attribution of 
resources and implying to rank research 
projects are made with colleagues from 
the same discipline. 
PhD scholarships must be attributed 
collectively by the pedagogic and 
scientific council of the doctoral 





Select PhD students: 
opening up the 
competition to national 
and int’l candidates  
Supervisors consider local* candidates, 
whom they know personally from 
previous years. 
*local=from their own university 
Doctoral schools must publish funded 
topics on their website and open 






introducing a form of 
public scrutiny  
Supervision is a bilateral relationship 
between student and supervisor. The 
supervisor is the sole judge of what must 
be done. No third party is legitimate to 
intervene in case of conflict. 
Supervision is under the collective 
responsibility of the doctoral school 
and must follow formal steps decided 
upon collectively. Heads of doctoral 





introducing a PhD 
committee  
Supervision is a bilateral relationship 
between student and supervisor. The 
supervisor is the sole judge of what must 
be done. No third party is legitimate to 
intervene in case of conflict. 
Supervision is a collective work 
accomplished by a team of 








Supervision is done by one individual.  Supervision is done by a senior and a 





Train PhD students: 
making in class training 
mandatory 
PhD is training to research through 
socialization and working with their 
supervisor, as in apprenticeship. 
PhD is training through research to 
academic and non academic careers. 





Train PhD students: 
setting up in-class 
training for PhD students 
PhD is training to research through 
socialization and working with their 
supervisor, as in apprenticeship. 
Doctoral schools set up in-class 
training to professionalize PhD 
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F – Table 6-Theoretical categories illustrated by quotations/examples 
Theoretical Category - VERTICAL MECHANISM SUPPORTING PRACTICE ADOPTION 
Sample Interview Excerpts / Example  Theoretical Sub-category 
1 - "We had a cultural difference with Chemists, which I think we managed to 
overcome. Chemists used to decide in advance which teams would get scholarships, 
but we did not like that. We wanted that scholarships be targeted on M2's best 
students. It became complicated to merge the two systems because they were 
different. So we went through heated discussions but well, we ended up finding 
solutions, we made it, as usual". (Biologist, Member of Scientific and Pedagogic 






2 - "I think our criteria of recruitment will get tighter because the Ministry 
evaluates us on the length of thesis, the number of publications and what doctors do 
after their thesis. For the Ministry, a PhD is three years. If the PhD lasts longer, 
that penalizes me [as a director of research center]". (Sociologist, Director of 
Research Center, Campus B)  Exerting 
financial 
coercion 
3 - "We count on 16 scholarships this year, hoping we will get more because we 
sent really great topics to the Ministry. We hope they will appreciate the set up of 
our competition, the changes we implemented to comply with their requirements" 
(Biologist, Member of Scientific and Pedagogic Council, Campus A) 
4 - "The University puts pressure on us to introduce co-supervision, through 
advices, letters from the vice-president, we hear that in meetings, at the University 
scientific council for example, it is in debate... This idea is transmitted by the 
Presidency and comes from medical or technological sciences, which do use co-
supervision. For us, the relation is more between a supervisor and his student." 
(Historian, Head of Doctoral School, Campus A)  Supporting 
extant 
practices 
5 - “We’ve had pressures from the Ministry, to set up mandatory classes; we had 
local pressures from the University because other doctoral schools had set up 
mandatory classes and we had not. So we had quite a few discussions about this 
subject, but we held on. Or off, I don’t know… (laugh)” (Linguist, ex-head of 
Humanities Doctoral School) 
Adoption Ceremonial adoption Hesitation Rejection
• Recruiting students from
other universities
• Funding projects first 
then students




• Setting up vocational
training
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6 - "In Social Sciences, the PhD topic is not clear at the beginning. It is more 
something we elaborate overtime, during conversations between the supervisor and 
the student. Between that and a topic that is "ready-to-go" before the student starts 
the PhD, there is a considerable difference. That is the experimental sciences 
model, and we are asked to align our practice on that. It is the Science that governs 
the university, and we [social scientists] do not have much choice". (Management 
Studies, Head of Doctoral School, Campus A)  
Theoretical Category - TRANSVERSAL MECHANISMS SUPPORTING PRACTICE ADOPTION 
7 - "The idea (of opening the recruitment) is to allow the university to attract 
excellent candidates on specialized research topics. We do not cover all subjects 
with our teaching. Sometimes it is interesting to go find competencies outside". 




8 - "Beforehand, the scholarships were entirely targeted to the student's merit. 
Obviously, the student's coach in M2 had an interest to boost him, which makes that 
the student's merit was not only his" (Biologist, Member of Scientific and 





9 - "The goal of the DS was also to raise consciousness about the PhD students' 
professional future. Students tended to settle down in PhD without thinking about 
the future, whereas we all know by now that only one third of them will integrate 
academia" (Biologist, Member of Scientific and Pedagogic Council, Campus A).  
10 - "We do have Law colleagues who take too many PhD students. It can reach 17, 
18 students. Clearly, it means that these students are not supervised" (Management 
Studies, Head of Doctoral School, Campus A).  
11 - "I consider that students have no competencies whatsoever to decide for the 
scientific policy" (Chemist, Member of Scientific and Pedagogic Council, Campus 
A) "It seems to me that it is more important to target the scholarships toward a 
topic rather than toward a student. It is the supervisor who is carrying the scientific 
policy. So we ought to fund laboratories, not students". (Biologist, Member of 




12 -"Our PhD students have in-class training about job market and generalist 
topics. We had the engineering school model under our eyes, there was no need to 
be a genius to see it and reproduce it!" (Engineering Science, Head of Doctoral 




FROM 13a - "Who are we to impose something on our colleagues" TO 13b - "I 
intervened [in a supervisor-student conflict] using the doctoral school council as a 
shelter. I acted in the name of a collective, so that it does turn into an interpersonal 





14"The head of a DS is at the service of the doctoral training, of the research 
teams, but it is not a role of service in which we only have to give our signature to 
documents without reading them. My role has been to help laboratories to build 
excellence through the management of PhDs, to see how, through certain criteria 
we could help laboratories to go further. That is my experience as a manager: you 
have to take your responsibilities and not expect to be blessed by everyone". 
(Engineering Science, Head of Doctoral School, Campus A)  
15 - "Supervisors will choose in fine the student they want to work with, provided 
the latter has the right academic record. If the director prefers to choose someone 
because he knows him from beforehand, rather than an exceptional candidate, we 
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G – Table 7 – Combination of mechanisms and outcomes 
 
 
H – Figure 1 – Mechanisms supporting practice adoption 
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